/* * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2015-2024 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD * * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 *//* ... */#pragmaonce#include<stdbool.h>#include<esp_err.h>#include"soc/efuse_periph.h"#include"soc/soc_caps.h"#include"esp_image_format.h"#include"esp_rom_efuse.h"#include"sdkconfig.h"#include"esp_rom_crc.h"#include"hal/efuse_ll.h"9 includes#ifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32#include"esp32/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S2#include"esp32s2/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3#include"esp32c3/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3#include"esp32s3/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C2#include"esp32c2/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C6#include"esp32c6/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32H2#include"esp32h2/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32P4#include"esp32p4/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C5#include"esp32c5/rom/secure_boot.h"#elifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C61#include"esp32c61/rom/secure_boot.h"#endif#ifdefCONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V1_ENABLED#if!defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT)||!defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE)||!defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS)#error"internal sdkconfig error, secure boot should always enable all signature options"#endif/* ... */#endif#ifdef__cplusplusextern"C"{#endif/* Support functions for secure boot features. Can be compiled as part of app or bootloader code.*//* ... */#defineESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN32#ifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C2#defineESP_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGEST_LEN16#else#defineESP_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGEST_LEN32#endif#ifdefCONFIG_EFUSE_VIRTUAL_KEEP_IN_FLASH#include"esp_efuse.h"#include"esp_efuse_table.h"/* ... */#endif/** * @brief Secure Boot Signature Block Version field *//* ... */typedefenum{ESP_SECURE_BOOT_V1_ECDSA=0,/*!< Secure Boot v1 */ESP_SECURE_BOOT_V2_RSA=2,/*!< Secure Boot v2 with RSA key */ESP_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA=3,/*!< Secure Boot v2 with ECDSA key */}{ ... }esp_secure_boot_sig_scheme_t;#ifCONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME#defineESP_SECURE_BOOT_SCHEMEESP_SECURE_BOOT_V1_ECDSA#elifCONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME#defineESP_SECURE_BOOT_SCHEMEESP_SECURE_BOOT_V2_RSA#elifCONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME#defineESP_SECURE_BOOT_SCHEMEESP_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA#endif#ifCONFIG_SECURE_BOOT||CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT/** @brief Get the selected secure boot scheme key type * * @return key type for the selected secure boot scheme *//* ... */staticinlineconstchar*esp_secure_boot_get_scheme_name(esp_secure_boot_sig_scheme_tscheme){switch(scheme){caseESP_SECURE_BOOT_V2_RSA:return"RSA";...caseESP_SECURE_BOOT_V1_ECDSA:caseESP_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ECDSA:return"ECDSA";...default:return"Unknown";...}{...}}{...}/* ... */#endif/** @brief Is secure boot currently enabled in hardware? * * This means that the ROM bootloader code will only boot * a verified secure bootloader from now on. * * @return true if secure boot is enabled. *//* ... */staticinlineboolesp_secure_boot_enabled(void){#ifCONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32#ifdefCONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V1_ENABLED#ifndefCONFIG_EFUSE_VIRTUAL_KEEP_IN_FLASHreturnefuse_ll_get_secure_boot_v1_en();#elsereturnesp_efuse_read_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_ABS_DONE_0);#endif/* ... */#elifCONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED#ifndefCONFIG_EFUSE_VIRTUAL_KEEP_IN_FLASHreturnefuse_ll_get_secure_boot_v2_en();#elsereturnesp_efuse_read_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_ABS_DONE_1);#endif/* ... */#endif/* ... */#else#ifndefCONFIG_EFUSE_VIRTUAL_KEEP_IN_FLASHreturnefuse_ll_get_secure_boot_v2_en();#elsereturnesp_efuse_read_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_EN);#endif/* ... */#endifreturnfalse;/* Secure Boot not enabled in menuconfig */}{ ... }/** @brief Generate secure digest from bootloader image * * @important This function is intended to be called from bootloader code only. * * This function is only used in the context of the Secure Boot V1 scheme. * * If secure boot is not yet enabled for bootloader, this will: * 1) generate the secure boot key and burn it on EFUSE * (without enabling R/W protection) * 2) generate the digest from bootloader and save it * to flash address 0x0 * * If first boot gets interrupted after calling this function * but before esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable() is called, then * the key burned on EFUSE will not be regenerated, unless manually * done using espefuse.py tool * * @return ESP_OK if secure boot digest is generated * successfully or found to be already present *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_generate_digest(void);/** @brief Enable secure boot V1 if it is not already enabled. * * @important If this function succeeds, secure boot V1 is permanently * enabled on the chip via efuse. * * @important This function is intended to be called from bootloader code only. * * @important In case of Secure Boot V1, this will enable r/w protection * of secure boot key on EFUSE, therefore it is to be ensured that * esp_secure_boot_generate_digest() is called before this .If secure boot is not * yet enabled for bootloader, this will * 1) enable R/W protection of secure boot key on EFUSE * 2) enable secure boot by blowing the EFUSE_RD_ABS_DONE_0 efuse. * * This function does not verify secure boot of the bootloader (the * ROM bootloader does this.) * * Will fail if efuses have been part-burned in a way that indicates * secure boot should not or could not be correctly enabled. * * @return ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE if efuse state doesn't allow * secure boot to be enabled cleanly. ESP_OK if secure boot * is enabled on this chip from now on. *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_permanently_enable(void);/** @brief Enables secure boot V2 if it is not already enabled. * * @important If this function succeeds, secure boot V2 is permanently * enabled on the chip via efuse. * * @important This function is intended to be called from bootloader code only. * * @important In case of Secure Boot V2, this will enable write protection * of secure boot key on EFUSE in BLK2. .If secure boot is not * yet enabled for bootloader, this will * 1) enable W protection of secure boot key on EFUSE * 2) enable secure boot by blowing the EFUSE_RD_ABS_DONE_1 efuse. * * This function does not verify secure boot of the bootloader (the * ROM bootloader does this.) * * @param image_data Image metadata of the application to be loaded. * * Will fail if efuses have been part-burned in a way that indicates * secure boot should not or could not be correctly enabled. * * @return ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE if efuse state doesn't allow * secure boot to be enabled cleanly. ESP_OK if secure boot * is enabled on this chip from now on. *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_v2_permanently_enable(constesp_image_metadata_t*image_data);/** @brief Verify the secure boot signature appended to some binary data in flash. * * For ECDSA Scheme (Secure Boot V1) - deterministic ECDSA w/ SHA256 image * For RSA Scheme (Secure Boot V2) - RSA-PSS Verification of the SHA-256 image * * Public key is compiled into the calling program in the ECDSA Scheme. * See the apt docs/security/secure-boot-v1.rst or docs/security/secure-boot-v2.rst for details. * * @param src_addr Starting offset of the data in flash. * @param length Length of data in bytes. Signature is appended -after- length bytes. * * If flash encryption is enabled, the image will be transparently decrypted while being verified. * * @note This function doesn't have any fault injection resistance so should not be called * during a secure boot itself (but can be called when verifying an update, etc.) * * @return ESP_OK if signature is valid, ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE if * signature fails, ESP_FAIL for other failures (ie can't read flash). *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_tsrc_addr,uint32_tlength);/** @brief Secure boot verification block, on-flash data format. */typedefstruct{uint32_tversion;uint8_tsignature[64];}{ ... }esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t;/** @brief Verify the ECDSA secure boot signature block for Secure Boot V1. * * Calculates Deterministic ECDSA w/ SHA256 based on the SHA256 hash of the image. ECDSA signature * verification must be enabled in project configuration to use this function. * * Similar to esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(), but can be used when the digest is precalculated. * @param sig_block Pointer to ECDSA signature block data * @param image_digest Pointer to 32 byte buffer holding SHA-256 hash. * @param verified_digest Pointer to 32 byte buffer that will receive verified digest if verification completes. (Used during bootloader implementation only, result is invalid otherwise.) * *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(constesp_secure_boot_sig_block_t*sig_block,constuint8_t*image_digest,uint8_t*verified_digest);#if!CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32||CONFIG_ESP32_REV_MIN_FULL>=300#ifCONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED||CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT/** @brief Verify the secure boot signature block for Secure Boot V2. * * Performs RSA-PSS or ECDSA verification of the SHA-256 image based on the public key * in the signature block, compared against the public key digest stored in efuse. * * Similar to esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(), but can be used when the digest is precalculated. * @param[in] sig_block Pointer to signature block data * @param[in] image_digest Pointer to 32 byte buffer holding SHA-256 hash. * @param[out] verified_digest Pointer to 32 byte buffer that will receive verified digest if verification completes. (Used during bootloader implementation only, result is invalid otherwise.) * *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_verify_sbv2_signature_block(constets_secure_boot_signature_t*sig_block,constuint8_t*image_digest,uint8_t*verified_digest);/* ... */#endif/* CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT *//** * @brief Structure to hold public key digests calculated from the signature blocks of a single image. * * Each image can have one or more signature blocks (up to SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS). Each signature block includes a public key. *//* ... */typedefstruct{uint8_tkey_digests[SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS][ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];/* SHA of the public key components in the signature block */unsignednum_digests;/* Number of valid digests, starting at index 0 */}{...}esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t;/* ... */#endif// !CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32 || CONFIG_ESP32_REV_MIN_FULL >= 300/** @brief Legacy ECDSA verification function * * @note Deprecated, call either esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block() or esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block() instead. * * @param sig_block Pointer to ECDSA signature block data * @param image_digest Pointer to 32 byte buffer holding SHA-256 hash. *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(constesp_secure_boot_sig_block_t*sig_block,constuint8_t*image_digest)__attribute__((deprecated("use esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block instead")));#defineFLASH_OFFS_SECURE_BOOT_IV_DIGEST0/** @brief Secure boot IV+digest header */typedefstruct{uint8_tiv[128];uint8_tdigest[64];}{ ... }esp_secure_boot_iv_digest_t;/** @brief Check the secure boot V2 during startup * * @note This function is called automatically during app startup, * it doesn't need to be called from the app. * * Verifies the secure boot config during startup: * * - Correct any insecure secure boot settings *//* ... */voidesp_secure_boot_init_checks(void);#if!BOOTLOADER_BUILD&&(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME||CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME)/** @brief Scan the current running app for signature blocks * * @note This function doesn't verify that the signatures are valid or the * corresponding public keys are trusted, it only reads the number of signature * blocks present and optionally calculates the digests of the public keys * provided in the signature blocks. * * @param digest_public_keys If true, the key_digests fields in the * public_key_digests structure will be filled with the digests of the public * key provided in each signature block. Note that if Secure Boot V2 is enabled, * each public key will only be trusted if the same digest is also present in * eFuse (but this is not checked by this function). * * @param public_key_digests[out] Structure is initialized with the num_digests * field set to the number of signatures found. If digest_public_keys is set, * the public key digests are also calculated and stored here. * * @return * - ESP_OK - At least one signature was found * - ESP_ERR_NOT_FOUND - No signatures were found, num_digests value will be zero * - ESP_FAIL - An error occurred trying to read the signature blocks from flash *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_get_signature_blocks_for_running_app(booldigest_public_keys,esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t*public_key_digests);/* ... */#endif// !BOOTLOADER_BUILD && (CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_V2_SCHEME)/** @brief Set all secure eFuse features related to secure_boot * * @note * This API needs to be called in the eFuse batch mode. * i.e. A call to esp_efuse_batch_write_begin() should be made prior to calling this API to start the batch mode * After the API has been executed a call to esp_efuse_batch_write_commit()/esp_efuse_batch_write_cancel() * should be made accordingly. * @return * - ESP_OK - Successfully *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_enable_secure_features(void);/** @brief Returns the verification status for all physical security features of secure boot in release mode * * If the device has secure boot feature configured in the release mode, * then it is highly recommended to call this API in the application startup code. * This API verifies the sanity of the eFuse configuration against * the release (production) mode of the secure boot feature. * * @return * - True - all eFuses are configured correctly * - False - not all eFuses are configured correctly. *//* ... */boolesp_secure_boot_cfg_verify_release_mode(void);#if!defined(BOOTLOADER_BUILD)&&SOC_SUPPORT_SECURE_BOOT_REVOKE_KEY&&CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED/** @brief Returns the verification status of the image pointed by the part_pos argument against the public key digest present at index `efuse_digest_index` * * @param index[in] Index of public key digest present in efuse against which the image is to be verified * @param part_pos[in] It is a pointer to the bootloader/app partition. * * @return * - ESP_OK - if the image can be verified by the key at efuse_index. * - ESP_FAIL - if the image cannot be verified by the key at efuse_index. * - ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG: Error in the passed arguments. *//* ... */esp_err_tesp_secure_boot_verify_with_efuse_digest_index(intefuse_digest_index,esp_partition_pos_t*part_pos);/* ... */#endif// !defined(BOOTLOADER_BUILD) && SOC_SUPPORT_SECURE_BOOT_REVOKE_KEY && CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED#ifdef__cplusplus}{...}#endif
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